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Abstract
The new mechanists and the autonomy approach both aim to account for how bio-
logical phenomena are explained. One identifies appeals to how components of a 
mechanism are organized so that their activities produce a phenomenon. The other 
directs attention towards the whole organism and focuses on how it achieves self-
maintenance. This paper discusses challenges each confronts and how each could 
benefit from collaboration with the other: the new mechanistic framework can gain 
by taking into account what happens outside individual mechanisms, while the 
autonomy approach can ground itself in biological research into how the actual 
components constituting an autonomous system interact and contribute in different 
ways to realize and maintain the system. To press the case that these two traditions 
should be constructively integrated we describe how three recent developments in 
the autonomy tradition together provide a bridge between the two traditions: (1) a 
framework of work and constraints, (2) a conception of function grounded in the 
organization of an autonomous system, and (3) a focus on control.
Keywords Biological explanation · Organization · Function · Constraint · Control
Introduction
How should scientists explain biological phenomena? Many philosophers of sci-
ence, who focus on practices of biologists, have embraced some form of mechanistic 
explanation, according to which biological phenomena are viewed as the products 
of mechanisms that behave as they do because of their constitution (Machamer et al. 
2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Glennan 2017). Other philosophers of science, 
drawing upon a lineage of theoretical biologists and with the aim of developing a 
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theory of living and cognitive systems, have emphasized the distinctive organization 
of biological organisms as autonomous systems. To maintain themselves far from 
equilibrium with their environments, organisms rely on a closed network of con-
straints that (1) are constructed by the organism and (2) direct flows of free energy 
through the organism to perform functional activities within it (Moreno and Mossio 
2015). The first group espouses explanation in terms of mechanisms, the second in 
terms of closed networks of constraints that maintain themselves. Although these 
two philosophical traditions have largely developed independently of each other, we 
argue that they should be constructively integrated, as each supplies ingredients the 
other tradition has ignored or not accounted for in sufficient detail. We focus our dis-
cussion on the contributions of these philosophical traditions to biological explana-
tion, and the advantages of integrating them.1
The new mechanists in philosophy of science have followed the lead of cell and 
molecular biologists over the last century in explaining biological phenomena in 
terms of mechanisms, where mechanisms are understood as organized parts that 
together perform the activities required to generate the phenomenon. The research in 
biology has proven extremely productive. The new mechanists have focused in part 
on the research strategies by which scientists develop these explanations: localizing 
the phenomenon in a mechanism, decomposing it into constituent parts, determin-
ing what activities or operations these parts perform, and then determining how the 
parts are organized to generate the phenomenon. These activities take the mecha-
nism as the unit, with researchers directing their energies inside it. As we discuss 
in Sect. “Challenges confronting mechanists on which autonomy theorists can offer 
assistance”, however, the new mechanists have confronted a number of challenges in 
specifying the phenomena for which mechanisms are to be sought, the boundaries of 
mechanisms, and how to generalize mechanistic explanations.
In Sect.  “Challenges confronting autonomy theorists on which mechanists can 
offer assistance” we turn to the autonomy tradition. A driving question for this tra-
dition is to explain the distinctive features of biological organisms. Maturana and 
Varela (1980) characterized living organisms as autopoietic—each constructs itself 
as a whole from materials it procures from its environment. Moreno and Mossio 
(2015) have recently emphasized the central importance of procuring and constrain-
ing the flow of free energy and have characterized organisms as autonomous in vir-
tue of a mutual dependence between internally produced constraints, giving rise to 
‘closure of constraints’. The idea of autonomy influenced conceptual debates about 
life and cognition in theoretical biology, origins of life research, cognitive science 
and synthetic biology. Yet, as developed within the autonomy tradition, this account 
is highly abstract and holistic. It leaves uncertain how to ground it in biological 
1 The mechanist and the autonomy traditions are not the only perspectives on explaining biological phe-
nomena. Nicholson and Dupré (2018), for example, have recently advocated that a process perspective is 
preferable to a mechanistic one. Part of their criticism of mechanists is that mechanists reify mechanisms 
and their parts as fixed entities. We cannot address this challenge in detail here, but note that the mecha-
nist tradition does emphasize activities and many mechanists view mechanisms as themselves dynamical 
and transitory structures. More constructively, we welcome insights from process theorists that could fur-
ther enrich the integration of the new mechanists and autonomy theorists that we advocate here.
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research and to provide causal explanations of phenomena in the context of the 
autonomous organism.
In Sect.  “Towards bridging the two philosophical traditions” we develop three 
recent developments in the autonomy tradition that together provide a bridge 
between the two philosophical traditions: (1) a framework of work and constraints, 
(2) a conception of function grounded in an autonomous system, and (3) a focus on 
control. In Sect. “Autonomy considerations provide guidance for mechanistic expla-
nation” we develop how the notions of constraint and function and considerations 
of control provide insight on the issues which present challenges for the mechanis-
tic approach, while in Sect.  “Mechanistic approaches ground explanations of the 
autonomy of organisms” we show how recharacterizing mechanisms in terms of 
constraints allows the autonomy tradition to ground its accounts in terms of mecha-
nisms. Bridging the two traditions has the potential to enhance the explanations of 
biological phenomena they individually provide: It allows the new mechanists to 
look out from mechanisms to how they are produced and controlled in the organism 
so that they operate as needed to maintain the organism, and the autonomy tradition 
to look inward to the actual mechanisms that perform the critical activities, includ-
ing control activities, needed to maintain the organism.
We conclude in Sect.  “Conclusion: a call for constructive engagement between 
mechanism and autonomy” by calling for constructive engagement between the 
mechanistic and autonomy traditions, focusing in particular on control as a point 
of engagement. The production mechanisms that transform materials to build and 
repair an organism are subject to multiple control mechanisms that alter constraints 
within them so that they serve the needs of the organism (the notions of constraints 
and control are explicated in Sect. “Towards bridging the two philosophical tradi-
tions”). These control mechanisms are different from those that have been the pri-
mary focus of the new mechanists in that they operate on other mechanisms in light 
of information they procure about the conditions in the organism and the environ-
ment. Understanding control is required to understand how mechanisms actually 
operate in the service of the autonomy of the organism. Thus, a focus on control 
provides a natural point of productive engagement between the new mechanists and 
autonomy theorists.
Challenges confronting mechanists on which autonomy theorists can 
offer assistance
The new mechanists were largely motivated to develop accounts of mechanis-
tic explanation to address perceived inadequacies in the framework of deductive 
nomological (DN) explanation that had dominated discussions of explanation in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century. The DN framework had emphasized the 
importance of scientific laws. Recognizing that biologists seldom refer to laws when 
advancing explanations, Bechtel and Richardson (1993/2010) focused on the fact 
that biologists often explain a phenomenon by describing the responsible mecha-
nism, identifying its parts and operations. They and others (Craver and Darden 2013) 
have characterized numerous heuristics researchers employ to discover mechanisms.
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An example will provide the flavor of mechanistic explanations. After the role of 
DNA as the genetic material was established, researchers turned to the question of 
how genes give rise to proteins. Several findings pointed to the relevant components: 
the concentration of RNA in the newly discovered cell organelle, the endoplasmic 
reticulum, of structures, called ribosomes, on the rough endoplasmic reticulum, and 
of different forms of RNA. The different RNAs were soon linked to different func-
tions: ribosomal RNA constituted the ribosome, messenger RNA coded for the order 
of amino acids in a protein, and transfer RNA ferried specific amino acids to the 
locus on the messenger RNA that was then in the reading frame of the ribosome. 
Researchers established that these different activities or operations are organized so 
that together they generate polypeptide chains that then folded, either on their own 
or with the assistance of other proteins, into the form of the mature protein. [For a 
detailed analysis of the steps in the discovery of these mechanisms see Darden and 
Craver (2002)].
As informative as the new mechanists have been about the character of mecha-
nistic explanation and the strategies scientists use to reason from data to mechanis-
tic explanations, there are critical questions about how to pursue scientific inquiries 
that lead to mechanistic explanations on which new mechanists have yet to provide 
definitive answers. In their practices scientists themselves embrace answers to these 
questions and one might hope that accounts of mechanistic explanation could illumi-
nate these practices.
The first involves the very identification of mechanisms to investigate. The 
standard view among mechanists is that mechanisms are identified in terms of the 
phenomenon they explain. However, without an account of what to count as a phe-
nomenon and of how to pick out the relevant phenomenon among many, appealing 
to phenomena does not solve the problem. Mechanists have said little about how 
phenomena are to be identified, largely simply embracing Bogen and Woodward’s 
(1988) understanding of phenomena as regularities or repeatable occurrences. This 
is not sufficient since there are a vast number of regularities or repeatable events 
occurring within organisms and only some of them are picked out as worth explain-
ing. Which one a researcher selects matters. As argued by Kauffman (1970), depend-
ing on what one takes the phenomenon to be, one will develop different decomposi-
tions of a system into mechanisms and of mechanisms into their component parts. In 
part, the selection a scientist makes is constrained by previous choices about what 
to explain: new phenomena are often identified in the context of explaining other, 
often-larger scale mechanisms. Craver (2007) refers to the “mosaic unity of neuro-
science” to characterize how different investigations, and the phenomena each inves-
tigates, are related to one another. This, however, pushes the challenge back to how 
the encompassing phenomena are selected.
Biologists have no problem making selections of phenomena that they find worth 
explaining. In their practice, they select phenomena that they take to be important 
in the lives of organisms (accordingly, they focus on circulating blood, not the gen-
eration of heart sounds). When Galvani (1791) found that connecting the interior 
of a muscle to the nerve by a conductive material generated an electrical current, 
he assumed it to be important to the ability of organisms to contract their mus-
cles. Much later, when Spudich observed motility when myosin was added to actin 
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filaments in an in vitro preparation (Spudich et al. 1985), he assumed that myosin 
contributed to the motility of living cells. Accounts of mechanistic explanation offer 
little insight into how assumptions such as these guide scientists’ selection of phe-
nomena to investigate.
Disease presents a context in which how phenomena are delineated is conse-
quential. Mechanists have pursued two strategies to extend mechanistic accounts 
to disease. One views diseases as themselves phenomena (Darden 2013). Accord-
ingly, one finds discussion of disease mechanisms—mechanisms that generate the 
disease (for an application of this framework to Krohn’s disease, see Darden et al. 
2018). The other views diseases as resulting when mechanisms that produce phe-
nomena in healthy organisms are broken or working aberrantly (Garson 2013). This 
view requires not only an account of how to justify the claim that a mechanism is 
not working correctly but also a basis for assessing the breakdown as a disease (not 
every disrupted process in a living organism is regarded as constituting a disease).2 
Each approach is embraced by some medical researchers and has given rise to valu-
able knowledge. Adopting a pluralistic perspective on how to apply the mechanis-
tic framework to disease may well be appropriate. Both approaches, though, require 
selection: which conditions to count as a disease or which mechanisms, when 
broken, result in disease. The mechanistic perspective itself does not answer this 
question.
Beyond selecting among the regularities in the world which to count as phenom-
ena to be explained, there is a further challenge in identifying the responsible mech-
anism: determining which entities constitute the mechanism and which are outside 
it. While humans make machines with reasonably clear boundaries (there is little 
ambiguity about the boundaries between a car or a coffee maker and its environ-
ment), it is much more difficult to identify the boundaries of mechanisms within bio-
logical organisms. What one finds in organisms is a vast network of causally inter-
acting entities. These interactions extend out into the environment. The challenge is 
to identify the entities that constitute a mechanism and distinguish them from oth-
ers that are external to the mechanism but interact with it. Craver (2007) advances 
a constitutive relevance criterion: the mechanism for a phenomenon consists of all 
the causal processes that causally affect the phenomenon.3 His goal is to provide 
2 Biological systems exhibit a high degree of robustness. Redundancy and degeneracy of functions may 
obviate the presence of a broken mechanism, for example when multiple copies of a gene are available 
so that even in case of one harmful mutation, the organism would still be able to produce functioning 
proteins. In other cases, the organism might employ ways to block the effects of broken mechanisms by 
eliminating the final product, such as misfolded proteins or malfunctioning cells. Moreover, effects of a 
broken mechanism may emerge as harmful only when the organism or the environment are in a particular 
state, for example during cell division, in presence of different food sources, predators, etc. These are all 
cases in which the living system needs to change its physiological regime or its behavior in the environ-
ment. Therefore, in many cases understanding disease may require looking outside the mechanism to 
focus on the organism as a whole.
3 Craver as well as many other mechanists embrace Woodward’s (2003) interventionist treatment of cau-
sation according to which any entity on which one can intervene to alter the effect counts as a cause. 
Craver fleshes this criterion for mechanism membership in terms of mutual manipulability. Some have 
objected that this violates Craver’s own view that the constitution relation between components and 
mechanisms is not causal. Krickel (2018) provides a metaphysical scheme in which mutual manipula-
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an objective criterion. As Kaiser (2017, p. 127) characterizes his position: “as soon 
as the phenomenon of interest is sufficiently specified and fixed, the boundaries of 
the mechanism for this phenomenon are fixed too, and do not depend on pragmatic 
factors.”
It is not clear that fixing the phenomenon is sufficient to demarcate the bound-
aries of mechanisms in the manner that scientists commonly do. Bechtel (2015a) 
describes how over time research on mechanisms often leads to discovering an 
increasing range, both spatially and temporally, of entities and activities that make a 
difference to the phenomenon. In the case of circadian rhythms in organisms ranging 
from fungi and plants to insects and rodents, research efforts in the 1990s identi-
fied on the order of ten proteins in each that could be characterized as constituting 
the mechanism (for a review, see Hastings and Herzog 2004). But taking advantage 
of new techniques that allowed for mass screening, Zhang and Kay (2010) identi-
fied over a thousand genes that affect the period or amplitude of circadian rhythms 
in mice. As these are two central features of the phenomenon of circadian rhyth-
micity, the proteins coded for by these genes might all be considered components 
of the circadian clock mechanism. Bechtel also invokes research by Marom (2010) 
that the action potential, often appealed to as an exemplary phenomenon by Craver, 
lacks start and termination conditions. Marom’s studies show that the effects of a 
single action potential on the neuron in which it occurred do not sharply terminate 
but drop off according to a power law, leading him to characterize the phenomenon 
as scale-free.
These findings, however, have not led researchers to vastly expand the spatial and 
temporal boundaries of the mechanisms they investigate. Bechtel’s contention is 
that researchers determine the boundaries of mechanisms based on their epistemic 
objectives. Noting that this challenges Craver’s strategy for rendering the bounda-
ries of mechanisms an objective matter, Kaiser (2017) concludes that this turns “the 
mechanistic account into a purely epistemic account that has been detached from 
almost all ontological commitments.” Glennan (2017) also adopts an epistemic per-
spective on the challenges in carving the world into mechanisms and mechanisms 
into their parts, but is more sanguine than Bechtel about the possibility of identify-
ing objective boundaries once the phenomenon is chosen. He appeals, for example, 
to Simon’s characterization of the distinctive activities that occur at the interface 
between mechanisms to identify boundaries. For our purposes, it is not necessary 
to take a stand on what considerations go into fixing the boundaries of mechanisms, 
but only note that it presents a challenge, of which mechanists are aware.
A further challenge confronting new mechanists stems from the fact that research 
on mechanisms is usually devoted to specific instances of the mechanism. Mechanis-
tic explanations, however, are nearly always presented in general terms (exceptions, 
as discussed by Glennan (2017), are singular events). The scope may vary: an expla-
nation might explain quorum sensing in a specific species (E. coli) or even a specific 
Footnote 3 (continued)
tion can serve to identify the components of a mechanism without violating the stricture that the relation 
between components and mechanisms is not causal.
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strain, or in gram negative bacteria, or in all prokaryotes. This raises the question 
of how mechanistic explanations are able to generalize over instances. Part of the 
answer is that the characterization of entities and activities must employ general 
terms. But how general? We focus in turn on two related issues: the basis for extend-
ing explanations from the instance investigated to target cases, which may involve 
organisms of other species, and when and how to abstract from details of individual 
mechanisms. Both of these are foci of current discussion by the new mechanists.
The challenge of generalization is evident in biologists’ widespread practice of 
investigating a mechanism in one species and applying the results to a different tar-
get species. Researchers investigate sleep in mice, fruit flies, and worms even though 
they are really interested in sleep in humans (Joiner 2016). In recent philosophy of 
science there is growing interest in the epistemic issues involved in selecting appro-
priate model organisms and drawing conclusions from them (Ankeny and Leonelli 
2011, 2020; Levy and Currie 2014; Hardesty 2018). For our purposes, what is of 
particular importance is that there are always important differences between the 
phenomenon and the mechanisms in model organisms and the target species. Con-
tinuing with the phenomenon of sleep, mice sleep during daylight and worms only 
during developmental stages. Yet the goal of this research is to draw conclusions 
about daily nocturnal sleep in humans. Philosophers such as LaFollette and Shanks 
(1996) and Weber (2005) have argued that researchers should not extrapolate from 
model organisms to target species but only use the models as sources of hypotheses 
that then must be investigated separately in the target organism. This makes sense 
in cases in which one lacks evidence for a descent relation that supports the hypoth-
esis that the mechanisms in the two cases are conserved from a common ancestor. 
When there is evidence of conservation from a common ancestor, scientists treat 
the research on models as providing evidence for the mechanism in the target. Since 
evolution is a process of descent with modification even in the case in which the 
mechanisms are judged to be conserved, critical differences can arise. Steel (2007) 
proposes a strategy that does not require amassing evidence for the mechanism 
solely from the target species: if one traces those processes that are most likely to 
manifest differences and fails to find any, he argues, one has grounds for extending 
the findings from one to the other. Finding differences between the processes in the 
two mechanisms is often grounds for scientists to reject an application from a model 
organism to a target, but not all differences matter equally. This raises the question: 
which differences matter?
An important requirement in order to extrapolate information about mechanisms 
from one species to another is to abstract from the details that distinguish the spe-
cies. The requirement for abstraction is broader than just cross-species research—it 
is required any time the same explanation is applied to multiple cases. Abstraction 
is commonly characterized as leaving out details, but which details can be left out? 
Details that distinguish the cases must be dropped. But are these the only details 
that should be deleted? And what is the basis for deciding which details to drop? 
There is general agreement among mechanists as to the importance of abstraction 
but not the basis for doing so. In setting out the norm for explanation, Craver and 
Kaplan (2020) appeal to the specification of the phenomenon as providing a crite-
rion of relevance—one can, and should, leave out any details that are not relevant to 
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the phenomenon. On the other hand, all relevant details belong in an ideally com-
plete mechanistic explanation.4 They acknowledge that explanatory accounts scien-
tists actually produce will fall short of this ideal, in part because not all the relevant 
details may be known.
Craver and Kaplan situate explanations (as opposed to explanatory models or 
accounts) in the world. Other philosophers follow Glennan (2017) in focusing pri-
marily on explanatory models and address questions about what details to include 
on the basis of the epistemic objectives of constructing the model. Boone and Pic-
cinini (2016), for example, describe how explanations may abstract in the service 
of mathematical and computational tractability or in characterizing processes at a 
given level of organization (leaving out details about how components in a mecha-
nism are realized). Levy and Bechtel (2013) describe how abstracting from features 
of the components of the mechanism can enable researchers to show how particular 
patterns of organization can generate a phenomenon independently of the proper-
ties of the entities so organized. Hochstein (2016) introduces the idea that different 
models of a mechanism, by abstracting in different ways, can give incompatible but 
useful models of the same mechanism. Much of the emphasis in mechanists’ dis-
cussion of abstraction focus on ways in which mechanistic accounts idealize, but 
except for Craver and Kaplan’s injunction to leave out irrelevant details, most have 
not advanced norms governing practices of abstraction.
In this section we have identified a number of challenges new mechanists face in 
developing their accounts of explanation: challenges in selecting phenomena, deter-
mining what belongs to a mechanism, and offering appropriately general explana-
tions. As we have noted, new mechanists have been addressing these issues. That 
they have not resolved them is not an indictment of mechanistic accounts. Our 
objective is to show, as we do in Sect. “Autonomy considerations provide guidance 
for mechanistic explanation”, these are issues on which the autonomy tradition can 
provide valuable insight. But first, we consider the challenges confronting the auton-
omy tradition that result from its historically eschewing mechanistic explanations.
4 A number of philosophers have challenged what they took to be an upshot of Craver’s characterization 
of the constitution of the mechanism that explanations that include more details about the mechanism are 
to be preferred; in mounting her criticism Chirimuuta (2014) characterizes Craver (as well as Kaplan, 
2011) as embracing the norm “the more details the better.” (For other criticisms of this norm, see Levy 
2013; Batterman & Rice, 2014). Recently, Craver and Kaplan (2020) have responded to these criticisms, 
arguing that they have been misunderstood and have advanced an alternative according to which explana-
tions are to be preferred which provide more details relevant to a contrast between phenomena. Appeal-
ing to contrasting explananda has been invoked in discussions of causal explanation to select, among 
multiple factors that contribute to an event, those that make a difference between different outcomes. 
However, as emphasized by Glennan (2017), mechanistic explanations are directed at how-questions, not 
why-questions. Attempts to answers questions about how some phenomenon happened are not typically 
directed at contrasts but at such questions as: How is the action potential generated? How do muscles 
contract? How are circadian rhythms produced? Without a contrast, it is hard to see how Craver and 
Kaplan can delimit which among the factors that make a difference to the phenomenon are to be included 
in the mechanism (for discussion, see Levy and Bechtel, forthcoming).
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Challenges confronting autonomy theorists on which mechanists can 
offer assistance
The biological autonomy approach focuses on the distinctive capability of living 
systems (prototypically cells and multi-cellular organisms) to produce their own 
components, respond actively to perturbations and maintain themselves without 
being completely driven by external factors. To quote Kauffman (2000), living 
systems are capable of “acting on their own behalf.” Biological autonomy, propo-
nents of the autonomy tradition maintain, is an organizational property realized 
in all living organisms. Moreover, it is a property of the whole living system. It 
cannot be referred to any specific component of it; rather, it rests on the peculiar 
and distinctive way the components—and the processes they are involved in—are 
related.
Inspired by the work of Claude Bernard (1865), by Cybernetics, and by Systems 
Theory, several theorists made pioneering theoretical contributions to the charac-
terization of biological autonomy in the late 1960s and early 1970s: Piaget (1967), 
Rosen (1972), Maturana and Varela (Varela et  al. 1974) and Gánti (1975). They 
embraced the view that organisms are far-from-equilibrium systems organized in 
such a way that they achieve self-production, self-maintenance, and reproduction 
through exchanges of matter and energy with their environment. Piaget, Rosen, 
and Maturana and Varela captured this with the concept of organisational closure 
according to which biological self-maintaining systems exhibit a circular topology: 
a network of processes of production in which each component is produced by oth-
ers in the network such that the network maintains itself.
The early autonomy tradition provided a valuable characterization of the distinc-
tive features of biological systems. The proponents emphasized the mutual depend-
ence between an autonomous system and its components, according to which the 
components are produced, maintained and repaired by the system and contribute to 
its realization and maintenance. However, these accounts were extremely abstract. 
One reason for this is found in the heritage of Cybernetics and its emphasis on 
formal characterizations of organisms. Such formal analysis allows for multiple 
realizability: different types of biological, physical and mechanical components 
could realize the same abstract relations, such as feedback loops. A further reason 
is that advocates of the autonomy tradition sought to distinguish living organisms 
from other examples of far-from-equilibrium systems that were being advanced 
at the time in the physical sciences, such as dissipative structures (Glansdorff and 
Prigogine 1971). While accepting that living systems are maintained in far-from-
equilibrium conditions, and are themselves dissipative, the autonomy framework of 
the 1960’s and 1970’s emphasized that the distinctive character of biological sys-
tems was to be found in their organization rather than in the physical properties of 
their components.
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The autonomy tradition has focused on the fact that organisms are capable of pro-
ducing their own components and maintaining themselves.5 Organizational closure 
was meant as a general explanans from which a number of important implications 
about living systems could be developed, including an understanding of biologi-
cal phenomenology from an internalist perspective (Maturana and Varela 1980), a 
neutralist account of evolution (Maturana and Varela 1987; Maturana-Romesin and 
Mpodozis 2000), embodied accounts of knowledge, cognition, and agency (Piaget 
1967; Varela et  al. 1991), and contributions to the debate on living systems and 
machines (Rosen 1991). However, apart from limited and still abstract attempts 
(Rosen 1972; Ganti 1975), the autonomous organization of the organism was not 
itself an explanandum; for that, causal relations and details about how they are real-
ized have to be fleshed out. While this approach, especially in its early formulations, 
has been focusing on providing general theoretical foundations for notions such as 
life and cognition, it has put considerably less effort into developing the contents of 
the theory by providing causal explanations of actual biological and cognitive phe-
nomena and how they specifically depend on, and contribute to autonomy.
This attitude of favoring theoretical considerations over causal explanations is 
not limited to the early autonomy tradition. Mossio and Pontarotti’s (2019) general 
account of heredity through appeal to organizational closure is a recent example. 
The authors make explicit that their focus is on the theoretical foundations of hered-
ity as a means of maintaining a far-from-equilibrium state in descendent organisms, 
not on providing an explanation of it: “Heredity, as discussed here, is a general con-
cept designating a kind of stability. As such, it does not explain how functions are 
conserved across generations, which would require describing specific mechanisms 
and processes for each (class of) hereditary object” (p. 27). The abstract characteri-
zation of organizational closure in maintaining living systems in a far-from-equilib-
rium state during their lifetime and across generations is the reason why the focus on 
closure has found a fertile terrain in theoretical biology, Artificial Life, Astrobiol-
ogy, synthetic biology and in the conceptual debates on the nature and origin of life 
but not, until recently, in experimental biology.
As a result of its heritage from Cybernetics, one does find references to mecha-
nisms in the autonomy tradition. Maturana and Varela (1980) explicitly refer to 
living systems as autopoietic machines, and to biological explanation requiring a 
mechanistic approach. However, their understanding of mechanism is vastly differ-
ent than that espoused by the new mechanists. As they make explicit in a paper enti-
tled “Mechanisms and Biological Explanation,” Varela and Maturana (1972) charac-
terize both human-made machines and biological mechanisms in terms of abstract 
relations, not their material realization, which for them can vary without changing 
the identity of the machine or mechanism. Their conception of what a mechanism is 
5 We use “maintenance” as a broad term to include procuring resources, using them to construct and 
repair the organism, and to reproduce. In general, the autonomy tradition has placed less emphasis on 
reproduction than maintenance of a single organism, but reproduction simply maintains a far-from-equi-
librium organization across generations (Saborido, Mossio, & Moreno, 2011).
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centers on organization and activities (interactions); components are characterized 
functionally in terms of their activities within a given organization.
It is important to emphasize that when they apply this view to biology, Var-
ela and Maturana conceive of the organism holistically as one mechanism, rather 
than a system made of distinct mechanisms. Given that the organism is character-
ized as a self-maintaining system whose activity and existence coincide, it follows 
that in a living system the phenomenon produced by the mechanism is the organ-
ism itself.6 Moreover, in characterizing organizational closure, and the circularity it 
implies, Varela et al. (1974) use holistic terms, appealing to the unitary character of 
the organization of production processes that maintain that very network, with little 
or no reference to the different contribution of components and how their relation-
ships are understood. According to autopoietic theory it is the unitary organization 
that the organism maintains as constant (Maturana and Varela 1980). In this view, 
an autopoietic system is not decomposable in the way new mechanists characterize 
mechanisms. This is further illustrated when Varela describes mathematically the 
circularity and self-reference that define an autonomous organization as an operator 
exhibiting a fixed point in a series of transformations, or as a self-referential equa-
tion f(f) = f (Varela 1979). Although Maturana and Varela mention a possible dis-
tinction between three types of relations in an autonomous organization—relations 
of constitution (membrane), specification (nucleic acids) and order (catalysts)—and 
stress the importance of a physical boundary produced from within,7 they do not 
investigate how these features are combined and how they contribute to the organi-
zation of the system. Instead, they characterize an autonomous system as a unitary 
and non-decomposable network, whose general properties and evolution in time 
can be object of dynamical descriptions and computer simulations (Varela 1979). 
In insisting that autopoiesis depends on the whole organization, they seek to avoid 
a reductive focus on the intrinsic properties of specific components (especially the 
genome as a program). Moreover, they reject a role for the notions of function, regu-
lation and control as describing how different types of components contribute to the 
physiology of the system. These notions, they claim, reflect the point of view of an 
external observer.
Rosen (1972) provides a somewhat more detailed mathematical characteriza-
tion of organizational closure, and how different sets of functional components are 
7 It is interesting that the most explicit biological aspect discussed by Maturana and Varela is also the 
one that generated most of the experimental work derived from the theory of autopoiesis, specifically in 
the areas of origins of life and synthetic biology focused on prebiotic compartments (Luisi 2006).
6 Maturana and Varela (1987) go beyond merely advancing abstract descriptions of mechanisms to 
advance an explanatory account. On the surface, they seem to share the distinction, advanced by mecha-
nists, between phenomenal and mechanistic models (Glennan, 2017). They argue that in order to explain, 
rather than describe a biological or cognitive phenomenon one needs to propose a generative mecha-
nism for it: “a mechanism or process that if allowed to operate gives rise, as a result of its operation, to 
the experience or phenomena to be explained” (Maturana-Romesin and Mpodozis 2000). But there are 
important differences: what they propose is a generative account that appeals to identifying the mecha-
nism responsible for the phenomenon but not to the details of the mechanism itself. Moreover, this mech-
anism coincides with the whole system that generates the biological or cognitive phenomenon, and their 
emphasis is on the distinctive overall organization of this system.
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required in order to achieve self-production and self-maintenance, but his account 
remains abstract and he does not connect mathematical functions to biological com-
ponents. Rosen explicitly rejects the idea of appealing to mechanisms in explaining 
biological phenomena. He seeks to emphasize the distinctive character of biological 
systems and sees invocation of mechanisms as obscuring the difference in organi-
zation between biological organisms and artifacts and ordinary physical objects.8 
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Rosen’s models are compatible with mech-
anistic accounts since his aim was to account for biological phenomena in terms 
of components and their operating on processes.9 Gánti (1975) is more concrete in 
advancing a hypothetical model, the Chemoton, of a minimal living system that is 
based on chemistry. In particular, he proposes a coupling of three chemical cycles—
a metabolic cycle, a template cycle, and a system boundary. Part of his account is 
a proposal for how Chemotons can reproduce, maintaining the minimal living sys-
tem. Still, this model is very abstract and far from real chemistry. Nonetheless, Gánti 
(2003) stresses the importance of accounting for how such organization, in which 
components continuously undergo transformations, can be realized by actual chemi-
cal components. Despite supplying more causal detail than Varela and Maturana 
on the distinctive biological features of autonomous organizations, both Rosen and 
Gánti avoid addressing real biological cases in discussing autonomous systems. As a 
result, they, as well as many others in the autonomy tradition, are not able to demon-
strate the applicability of the framework to actual biological organisms.
Towards bridging the two philosophical traditions
As characterized so far, the mechanist and autonomy traditions direct their atten-
tion differently—mechanists inside mechanisms, proponents of autonomy towards 
the whole organism. This results in the new mechanists downplaying what hap-
pens outside individual mechanisms and the autonomy tradition downplaying how 
the actual components constituting an autonomous system causally interact and 
contribute in different ways to realize and maintain the system. As a result, both 
approaches face several challenges in developing explanations of biological phe-
nomena. However, there have been developments in the autonomy tradition that 
point to a means of bridging between the two philosophical traditions. In this section 
we focus on three: (1) the introduction of the framework of work and constraints, 
allowing for the recharacterization of closure in terms of constraints, (2) the formu-
lation of an account of function and (3) a focus on control processes. As we will see 
8 It is important to point out that the specific objects of Rosen’s criticisms are Cartesian and Newtonian 
mechanisms and the application of machine models to biology (based on the separation between hard-
ware and software). According to Rosen, both are unable to capture the distinctive capability of biologi-
cal systems to realize self-producing and self-maintaining closed causal loops (Rosen, 1991).
9 This sense is close to the contemporary meaning of a mechanism as a causal mechanism, which pro-
vides “a step-by-step explanation of the mode of operation of a causal process that gives rise to a phe-
nomenon of interest,” (as discussed by Nicholson, 2012, p. 153).
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in subsequent sections, these provide the means for each philosophical tradition to 
draw upon the other.
First, Pattee (1972) invoked the notion of constraint, drawn from classical 
mechanics, in explaining the activities of organisms. A constraint is a structure 
that affects a process yet is locally unaffected by the process itself (i.e., it remains 
the same at the end of the process or returns to the same state; see Montevil and 
Mossio 2015). A paradigmatic example in biology is an enzyme which catalyzes a 
chemical reaction without being consumed. The term constraint implies limiting, 
but, as argued by Hooker (2013), constraints also create possibilities—a skeleton 
restricts the movements an organism can make, but also enables it to move in ways 
it couldn’t otherwise. One thing that is constrained in organisms is the diffusion of 
Gibb’s free energy, resulting, as characterized by Kauffman (2000), in the perfor-
mance of work. Gibb’s free energy (hereafter, free energy) is a measure, developed 
in thermodynamics, of available energy due to disequilibrium within a system that 
can be used to produce mechanical work—produce physical changes in components 
of the system.10
Although constraints are not changed during the interval during which they ena-
ble work to be done, they are themselves constructed over a longer time frame. As 
Kauffman also develops, it takes work, and hence free energy, to construct a con-
straint. The interplay of constraints and work gives rise to what Kauffman character-
izes as work-constraint cycles: constrains are needed to perform work, but work is 
required to establish constraints (Kauffman 2019). This applies as well to constraints 
that enable organisms to perform work: they must be constructed. This idea provides 
a means to reformulate Rosen’s (1972) formal model of closure in more concrete 
terms as the closure of constraints (Moreno and Mossio 2015; Montevil and Mossio 
2015): all the constraints operative in an organism must be constructed from other 
constraints. Some of these might be inherited from those constructed in a parent 
organism, but most are constructed by the organism itself during its lifespan. An 
organism is autonomous because it creates the set of constraints responsible for its 
own constitutive activities that maintain its existence. Accordingly, a cycle involv-
ing constraints is distinguished from other instances of cyclic organization such as 
the water cycle in which material is recycled. In the closure of constraints, it is the 
organization of constraints that recycles itself through its generative activities.
Reframing the notion of autonomy in terms of constraints allows the autonomy 
tradition to incorporate consideration of the material realization of autonomous sys-
tems (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004). It also provides a direct bridge to the new 
mechanists: mechanisms and their parts are constraints that direct flows of free 
energy into the performance of the activity associated with the mechanism (Winning 
and Bechtel 2018). Autonomy itself can be characterized in terms of mechanisms: 
through its mechanisms, the organism constructs and maintains other mechanisms, 
including those of its descendants. By linking constraints to mechanisms, proponents 
10 An information theoretic notion of free energy has been invoked in neuroscience and cognitive sci-
ence by Friston (2009) as a unifying principle. While drawing upon the same roots in thermodynamics, 
there are important differences between his use of the concept and ours.
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of autonomy can now fill in the missing biological causal grounding of that tradi-
tion by identifying the mechanisms responsible for autonomy. We develop this in 
Sect. “Mechanistic approaches ground explanations of the autonomy of organisms”.
Second, theorists in the autonomy tradition have recently developed a new 
account of biological function. Mechanists often speak of mechanisms and their 
parts as performing functions, but the accounts of function traditionally on offer 
are not sufficiently focused to characterize functions of biological mechanisms. 
Accounts that identify the function of a component with its causal role in a larger 
system (Cummins 1975) do not provide a normative basis for distinguishing which 
among many causal effects to count as the function of a component. The etiologi-
cal approach, which appeals to evolutionary history to identify effects that led the 
organism to be selected as functions (Millikan 1989), faces a number of problems, 
including that previous adaptations may no longer be functional for the organism. 
Mossio et al. (2009) draw upon the autonomy tradition to offer a more fine-grained 
characterization of the function of a constraint in terms of its role within a closed 
system of constraints within an existing organism.11 Drawing upon the above link-
ing of mechanisms with constraints, one can characterize the functions of mecha-
nisms in terms of their contributions to the maintenance of particular biological 
organisms.12 This allows one to explain the existence and operation of a mechanism 
by referring to its function within the organism.13 We consider how this provides 
insight addressing some of the challenges mechanists confront in the next section.
Third, the autonomy tradition has expanded its focus on what organismic activi-
ties support autonomy. Early autonomy theorists focused on how the parts of a sys-
tem are produced, transformed and repaired from within the system. However, to 
remain viable, especially in changing environments, autonomous systems must also 
11 This account of functions was inspired by the work of McLaughlin (2001) and Christensen and Bick-
hard (2002), among others, which grounds functional attributions in the contributions of biological traits 
to the maintenance of the system that harbors them. Within this framework functional roles are usually 
attributed to physiological traits involved in the maintenance of the organism. However, a functional 
grounding has been provided for cross-generational functions such as reproduction  and for altruistic 
behaviors, which do not directly contribute to the maintenance of the organism. In this view, reproductive 
traits are functional because they are produced by the autonomous biological organization of the par-
ents at some point in their life cycle, and they contribute to re-establishing that very organization in the 
offspring (Saborido et al., 2011; Mossio and Pontarotti, 2019). For a criticism and response see, respec-
tively, Artiga and Martinez (2016) and Mossio and Saborido (2016). For a functional characterization of 
altruistic behaviors, see Frick et al. (2019).
12 In embracing Mossio et  al.’s account of function as appropriate in understanding functions in bio-
logical organisms, we are not arguing that it provides a universal account for all function attributions. 
Wimsatt (1972) advanced a general theoretical account that covers a broad range of ways functions are 
attributed to entities. A key variable in Wimsatt’s account is purpose. Maintaining themselves and rep-
licating are critical purposes for living organisms as far-from-equilibrium systems. If they fail to satisfy 
these purposes, organisms cease to exist. Wimsatt’s framework, though, makes clear that functions can 
be attributed in other contexts for systems with different purposes.
13 Scientists may identify functions in other ways, for example by adopting an etiological evolutionary 
account (Millikan 1989; Neander 1991). Yet, in that case one should expect that when scientists identify 
a function, they do so on the basis of evolutionary evidence. However, this is not what typically happens 
in scientific practice. When biologists characterize a function, they may do it on the basis of things hap-
pening at the present time within an organism, and only afterwards attempt to reconstruct its evolutionary 
past (see Frick et al. 2019 for a discussion of this issue in studies on biological communication).
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respond adaptively, changing what activities they perform in ways appropriate to 
the circumstances they face. Only through such adaptive response can organisms 
counteract potentially destabilizing interactions with the environment and amongst 
internal components. Di Paolo (2005) emphasized the importance of developing 
the autonomy framework in this direction. To do so, some autonomy theorists have 
introduced a different type of constraint—regulatory constraints—into the account 
of closure (Bich et  al. 2016). Among the new mechanists, Winning and Bechtel 
(2018) have characterized a type of mechanism that they term a control mecha-
nism in similar terms. Regulatory constraints or control mechanisms are sensitive 
to environmental or internal conditions requiring adaptation and act upon other con-
straints or mechanisms to selectively shift between different available regimes of 
self-maintenance in such a way as to contribute to the viability of the system.14 A 
classic example of this type of shift is the one occurring in bacteria between distinct 
metabolic regimes based on the availability of different sources of sugar (lactose 
and glucose). We also explore how the distinction between control and controlled 
mechanisms addresses some of the challenges facing the new mechanists in the next 
section.
Autonomy considerations provide guidance for mechanistic 
explanation
As we have seen, to explain a phenomenon the new mechanists identify it with a 
mechanism and then look inside it to explain how it produces the phenomenon in 
terms of its organized parts and operations. Besides identifying inputs or start-up 
conditions and how they arise, the only motivation for looking outside the mecha-
nism is if researchers determine that the boundaries of the mechanism were set too 
narrowly—that entities outside those boundaries causally affect the phenomenon. In 
contrast, the autonomy tradition advocates looking to the organism and how individ-
ual mechanisms fit into the closure associated with the organism—how the mech-
anism was built and maintained by other components of the organism and how it 
in turn contributes to building and maintaining other components. New mechanists 
can analyze how the phenomenon associated with one mechanism may figure in a 
larger-scale mechanism. However, by identifying larger and more comprehensive 
mechanisms that carry out higher-level activities, one will not arrive at an account 
of the organism as an autonomous system. Rather, one will only arrive at individual 
higher-level phenomena exhibited by autonomous systems, such as moving or feed-
ing. From this perspective, autonomous systems themselves can be construed, to 
use Glennan’s terminology (2017), as ‘mechanistic systems’, that is, as systems of 
14 The ability of control mechanisms (or regulatory constraints) to be sensitive to conditions that affect 
the maintenance of the autonomous system depends on making measurements. These alter constraints in 
the control mechanism and so determine what work a control mechanism performs on the constraints of 
the controlled mechanism.
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mechanisms15 that are not necessarily mechanisms themselves. The two approaches 
do not coincide but are not incompatible and can engage fruitfully with each other. 
In the previous section we showed how the autonomy tradition has recently offered 
an account of biological function and has come to emphasize regulation or con-
trol. In this section we explore how these foci of the autonomy tradition provide 
resources to help address the challenges confronting new mechanists that we identi-
fied in Sect. “Challenges confronting mechanists on which autonomy theorists can 
offer assistance”.
First, the autonomy tradition’s account of function provides a perspective from 
which to select which among activities occurring in a living organism are phenom-
ena to be explained. Specifically, it is important to explain those activities that count 
as functions in virtue of their contribution to the maintenance, repair, and reproduc-
tion of the current organism. As argued by Garson (2013) among others (see also 
Glennan 2017), adopting a functional approach is not only compatible with mecha-
nistic accounts but also widely embraced and recognized as useful. By incorporating 
a focus on organisms as maintaining autonomy, the mechanist framework acquires 
a basis for picking out phenomena that is in line with scientific practice. Activities 
that do not affect the autonomy of the organism are not regarded as important as 
those that contribute to it. Such considerations seem to figure in scientists’ judg-
ments about what to investigate.
As articulated by Glennan (2017), functional considerations provide a normative 
perspective on mechanisms.16 Norms enable both characterizing proper function-
ing but also what counts as impaired functioning. The autonomy tradition provides 
a perspective for articulating a mechanistic perspective on disease—what diseases 
do is impair the ability of the organism to maintain autonomy. Some diseases are 
brought about by external agents such as bacteria that are acting to promote their 
autonomy (whether viruses count as autonomous systems is more controversial). 
But for those organisms afflicted with diseases, it is the challenges to their ability to 
maintain itself that are most relevant (Saborido and Moreno 2015). In some cases, 
disease involves the inability of a production mechanism to perform its function 
(e.g., for the kidney to filter and remove waste from the blood). But in many oth-
ers, it involves failure of control mechanisms to regulate these mechanisms in the 
service of the organism. Cancers (Bechtel 2018) and psychopathologies (Bechtel 
2020) provide illuminating examples.17 While it is challenging to characterize what 
15 A mechanistic system is a system in which mechanisms act. It can also participate in larger mecha-
nisms: an example is the contribution of yeast to the phenomenon of fermentation in a bioreactor.
16 Recently, working within the mechanist tradition, Winning (2020) has developed a related but dis-
tinctively different account of function in terms of the perspective of a biological organism on its proper 
functioning. It too advances a normative perspective, one grounded in the activities through which an 
organism enforces its own standards.
17 A consideration of control mechanisms provides a useful complement to Darden’s (2013) account of 
mechanisms that produce disease symptoms. In many cases, the mechanism that results in disease symp-
toms comprises components that figure in healthy functioning but are operating in an altered manner. 
Often is it altered control processes that result in the components operating differently. Darden’s account 
identifies the start or setup conditions and the productive continuity between components in generating 
the disease state, while the control perspective can provide insight into how these components came to 
operate differently than they do in a healthy organism.
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counts as disease using just the resources of the new mechanists, by drawing upon 
the autonomy perspective’s construal of function, the mechanist tradition acquires a 
perspective for assessing which mechanistic processes, or disruptions in them, con-
stitute disease.
Second, the autonomy tradition can provide insight into how to fix the boundaries 
of mechanisms. As we discussed in Sect.  “Challenges confronting mechanists on 
which autonomy theorists can offer assistance”, theorists such as Glennan and Bech-
tel appeal to epistemic objectives of scientists. To others, such as Craver and Kai-
ser, this results in an objectionably subjective account of mechanisms. Just as con-
siderations of contributions to autonomy can be used to delineate phenomena, they 
can be used to settle where the boundaries of a mechanism should be drawn. When 
Zhang and Kay (2010) identified over a thousand additional proteins that affected 
the period and amplitude of circadian oscillations, in presenting their analysis, they 
nonetheless distinguished core clock genes from the extended set of proteins that, 
when altered, alter circadian rhythms. This is not an arbitrary choice but principled. 
What supports this distinction? In its account of adaptive responses, the autonomy 
tradition provides insight. It makes a distinction between constraints that direct flows 
of energy within a system and control processes or mechanisms that operate on 
these constraints to alter their function. Although circadian biologists generally do 
not make special note of the free energy deployed in maintaining circadian rhythms, 
nonetheless the proteins constituting the core clock constitute an organized systems 
in which free energy is constrained to produce an oscillation in the expression of 
proteins, including those that regulate other activities. The other proteins that can 
affect circadian rhythms all do so by modulating the activity of these proteins. They 
are performing a control activity by altering the flexible constraints in the mecha-
nism generating circadian oscillations. Thus, one can distinguish components that 
are core to a given mechanism and those that act on it to alter its constraints and 
hence its operation.
The distinction between control activities and the activities within the controlled 
mechanism applies far beyond this one case. To distinguish control processes from 
those within controlled mechanisms, one needs to focus on the work that a mech-
anism is doing. Some mechanisms in living organisms perform work that directly 
serves to maintain the organism—procuring and digesting food, synthesizing body 
parts, locomoting, etc. These are the ones we have called production mechanisms. 
But most components of organisms perform work on the constraints within other 
mechanisms, often other control mechanisms. Indeed, the circadian clock is itself a 
control mechanism, regulating other mechanisms. The other mechanisms affecting 
its flexible constraints are regulating it. Tracking the work that is performed, and 
when that work is being performed on other mechanisms, provides a principled way 
of drawing boundaries around mechanisms.
Third, the autonomy perspective provides resources to address challenges in 
addressing the generalizability of mechanistic explanations. One challenge is to 
explain when investigations of mechanisms in model organisms, often of different 
species, can be extrapolated to a target organism. Evidence that the model and the 
target are related phylogenetically in such a manner that they are conserved versions 
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of the same ancestorial mechanism is viewed as supporting extrapolation from the 
model to the target. However, since evolution also results in modifications, there will 
be differences. The question is when differences undercut the inference. The auton-
omy tradition offers an important consideration: are the mechanism in the model and 
the target serving the maintenance of the organism in the same way? If they are not, 
the differences may well be consequential. To the degree that they contribute to the 
maintenance of the organism in the same manner, the case for extrapolating results 
from one to the other is stronger. In the case of sleep mechanisms, the evidence is 
strong that sleep in fruit flies serves the same function—flies and humans exhibit 
similar responses when deprived of daily sleep, including suffering memory impair-
ments and eventually dying (Shaw et  al. 2002). The fact that worms only enter a 
sleep-like state during development makes the challenge of demonstrating common 
function more difficult. In this case, however, researchers have turned the reasoning 
around—since many of the components involved in sleep in worms are homologous 
to those in animals, researchers have turned to them as a potential source for iden-
tifying the contribution of sleep to autonomy and answering the question of why 
animals sleep (Keene and Duboue 2018).
Functional considerations also provide guidance as to how much abstraction 
makes sense in characterizing a mechanism. If abstracting from details of a given 
mechanism still enables researchers to explain how it contributes to the function it 
performs, the account will be regarded as informative. Moreover, insofar as it shows 
how the phenomenon is produced in different cases as a result of them all satisfy-
ing the abstractly characterized operations, it will reveal that the differing details do 
not make a difference to the phenomenon (as described). Thus, when Alon (2007) 
demonstrated that motifs—subnetworks of two, three, or four units—under broad 
assumptions about the character of the entities realizing the units, would exhibit 
comparable behaviors on which the organism relied, he showed that it was the pat-
tern of connection, not the specific constitution of the units that accounted for the 
function (Levy and Bechtel 2013). If, however, the function is lost as one leaves out 
detail, then the account will be dismissed as too abstract.
Before turning to the contributions appeals to mechanisms can make to the auton-
omy tradition, we briefly consider how mechanists’ engagement with two biologi-
cal phenomena, homeostasis and self-organization, might benefit from engagement 
with the autonomy tradition. In the case of homeostasis, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
(2009) articulate Krebs’ reasoning about how cycles such as the ones he discovered 
allow chemical reactions to regenerate their components, while Craver and Darden 
(2013) introduce negative feedback as a strategy for explaining homeostatic phe-
nomena by maintaining an equilibrium state. Homeostasis is often viewed as a good 
in itself, but the autonomy tradition motivates inquiring how, in different cases, it 
serves or does not serve the maintenance of the organism. Deviations from a usual 
range of values are not necessarily bad, and the maintenance of homeostasis is not 
necessarily good: under threat conditions restoration of normal values may be dis-
astrous. As Bich et  al. (2020) argue, whether maintaining homeostasis is good or 
bad depends on the general state of the organisms and its adaptive needs. Likewise, 
self-organization can be advantageous in organizing living systems and Glennan 
(2017) has shown how it can be understood in terms of affinitive relations between 
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parts of mechanisms. Discussions of self-organization have figured prominently on 
discussion of the origin of life (Moreno and Ruiz-Mirazo 2009), in morphogenesis 
during developmental processes (Newman and Forgacs 2005), and more recently 
in cell biology (Karsenti 2008), offers microtubule patterning as an example). But, 
as Mossio and Bich (2017) emphasize, self-organization is not sufficient for auton-
omy—that requires self-organizing subsystems to contribute to the maintenance of 
an organism. This often requires that self-organizing capacities by brought under 
various control processes. Homeostasis and self-organization each are important for 
understanding how biological organisms are autonomous systems. Yet, they alone 
do not make a system autonomous. In the case of both homeostasis and self-organi-
zation, mechanists can benefit by following the autonomy tradition and focusing on 
when they contribute to the autonomy of the organism.
Mechanistic approaches ground explanations of the autonomy 
of organisms
Turning to the autonomy tradition, the ambivalent attitude towards appeal to mecha-
nisms and the emphasis on abstraction, which can be traced back to its early roots 
but which is still present in more recent work, runs the risk of hindering the ability 
to flesh out the actual causal relationships underlying autonomy. While not denying 
the paramount importance of foundational theoretical work, it is also crucial to inte-
grate that work with an understanding of the underlying biological processes. Devel-
oping a correct theory of living organisms, such as the autonomy approach aims to 
do, should be grounded in an understanding of how autonomy is actually realized by 
biological systems.
The other limitation identified in Sect. “Challenges confronting autonomy theo-
rists on which mechanists can offer assistance” is that the autonomy tradition often 
seems to embrace a holism that countenances undifferentiated organization. It is not 
surprising then, that most recent scientific work on autonomy has been carried out 
by employing tools such as network modeling, which have been applied to inves-
tigate the dynamical properties (e.g., stability and robustness) of abstract theoreti-
cal models such as Rosen’s (see, for example, Piedrafita et al. 2010).18 As recently 
pointed out by Moreno and Suárez (2020), among others, network modelling is a 
holistic tool used to study and predict global dynamical properties of large sets of 
interacting entities.19 While useful in characterizing and studying global activities of 
biological systems, network models, unless supplemented, do not provide a causal 
explanation of how the individual parts operate and interact within autonomous 
18 Properties less related to basic self-maintenance such as reproduction have been given less attention, 
although with some exceptions; see, for example, Mavelli and Ruiz-Mirazo’s (2007) proposal advanced 
in the context of discussions on the origins of life.
19 For an analysis of the relationship between networks and mechanisms, and how to use network 
description to identify mechanisms see Bechtel (2015a, 2015b).
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systems to produce these global activities. Not only that: for network models to pro-
vide a more reliable and biologically relevant understanding of global properties, 
they must be constructed on information about the parts and their operations.20
The abstractness and holism of the autonomy approach can be properly grounded 
by developing causal mechanistic explanations of biological functions that iden-
tify the constraints generated within the autonomous system. As we have noted, 
the autonomy framework provides a way to identify functions in the context of the 
organization of the system. The multiplicity of functions points to a multiplicity of 
constraints (mechanisms) that contribute differentially to the maintenance of that 
organization (Mossio et al. 2009). By examining these, the autonomy tradition can 
ground its abstract accounts in concrete causal details about how autonomous sys-
tems in fact maintain themselves.21
One further holistic aspect which is still manifest in some recent accounts of 
autonomy is the identification of one function with one constraint subject to closure, 
as proposed by Mossio et  al. (2009) and Montevil and Mossio (2015). Sometimes, 
depending on the scale of observation, it can be the case that a single constraint can be 
associated with a biological function without losing explanatory power. For example, 
for some explanatory purposes, the heart can be considered as an individual constraint 
which functionally contributes to the circulation of blood. Yet pursuing this strategy 
risks overlooking complexity underlying the realization of a biological function and 
how this complexity matters for the overall functioning of the system. Different parts 
of the heart (the muscles, valves, etc.) contribute differently to the function of the 
heart. What renders it plausible to treat it as one constraint instead of a mechanism 
employing several interacting constraints is that it appears as a single organ. Yet ana-
lyzing the organ as a mechanism constituted by several constraints would be especially 
informative when the organ is malfunctioning or to understand how it is controlled.
The strategy of identifying one function with one constraint is less plausible for 
functions that are realized through different steps by different types of constraints. 
Consider vascularization. The whole vascular system can be considered as one mac-
roscopic constraint acting on the flow of blood. However, if the objective is under-
standing the rate at which blood is flowing to a certain part of the body, it will be 
beneficial to describe the system as a mechanism and to identify the relevant con-
straints that constitute it, such as the heart, arteries and veins, muscles compressing 
veins, etc. A similar consideration applies at smaller scales. The activity of complex 
molecular machinery such as ATPases and how they perform their function in the 
cell, can be explained if they are described in mechanistic terms as ordered structures 
of interacting constraints (Militello and Moreno 2018). Mechanistic details are useful 
for understanding allosteric enzymes in which it is informative to distinguish as dif-
ferent constraints the allosteric and catalytic sites, as well as additional phosphoryla-
tion sites. Controlled catalysis results from the interaction of these components.
20 Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010) draw a contrast between modeling of circadian rhythms, which is 
typically grounded on information about the component parts and operations of circadian clocks, and 
modeling of cognitive capacities in cognitive science, which is typically not so grounded.
21 Initial work in this direction has been done in the case of glycaemia regulation (Bich, Mossio, & Soto, 
2020) and organogenesis (Montévil et al. 2016).
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As the case of allosteric enzymes makes clear, the risks implied by a holistic view 
of the relationship between constraints and functions, and the advantages of adopt-
ing mechanistic explanations in the autonomy approach are especially evident in the 
case of control. To achieve control, controllers must base their actions on states of 
sensors that measure the state of the system or the environment. In biological sys-
tems these two capabilities are often embedded in distinct and even noncontiguous 
structures, and the connection between them is realized by further constraints act-
ing as signal transducers. Consider the control of the direction of movement in bac-
teria chemotaxis. Chemotaxis is a form of behavioral adaptive response to chang-
ing environmental conditions. Bacteria such as E. coli alter the direction in which 
they swim on the basis of the gradient in the concentration of metabolites in the 
medium they inhabit (Eisenbach 2004). They do this by changing the mode of rota-
tion of their flagella while exploring their environment. The control of movement 
relies on at least three subsystems: (a) a complex receptor subsystem of transmem-
brane methyl-accepting chemotaxis proteins (MCPs) activated by specific chemoat-
tractants or chemorepellants; (b) proteins which transduce the state of the receptors 
to the flagella through the cytoplasm by means of non-covalent post-translational 
modifications (phosphorylations); and (c) the flagella themselves, molecular com-
plexes which include control sites where the modulation of the mode of rotation 
takes place.
Considering the whole control subsystem (receptors, transduction proteins and 
control sites on the flagella) as an individual functional constraint fails to explain 
why and how a bacterium moves adaptively in the environment to maintain itself. 
The complexity of the sensor complex in integrating different types of measure-
ments, for example, can be better understood by adopting a mechanistic explanation 
within the autonomy framework. In E. coli the receptor complex is made of five 
types of MCPs which are sensitive to different ligands, plus Che proteins that, by 
methylating and demethylating the MCPs, allow the latter to adapt in response to the 
previous concentration so that they measure whether concentrations are increasing 
and decreasing. The differing number and position of these molecules also accounts 
for differences in responses between individual bacteria belonging to the same spe-
cies. The adaptive behavior of the bacterium, therefore, can be better explained as a 
functional phenomenon within the autonomy approach if control is explained mech-
anistically as the result of the organization of a set of constraints.
In addition, the holistic approach may overlook another central aspect of control: 
the loci where control is exerted. Control can be exerted on different structures that 
constrain different steps of a process. The presence of specific loci where control is 
exerted plays an important role in the context of the organism. It allows it to inte-
grate and coordinate different functions. Consider a functional pathway realized by 
more than one constraint. If one or more constraints responsible for some given steps 
are flexible, their operations can, in principle, be modulated by control constraints in 
the system, which in turn operate on the basis of measurements of the state of the 
system and the environment. When more than one constraint is flexible, and each is 
controlled by distinct control constraints sensitive to different variables, the mecha-
nism can work as an integration hub and operate on the basis of different sources of 
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information (which in turn can be controlled by several other constraints). Consider 
the phenomenon of insulin release in mammals, which is critical in controlling the 
metabolism and concentration of glucose, with glucose in turn contributing to the 
maintenance of the constraints involved.22 Pancreatic beta-cells continuously pro-
duce and store insulin in vesicles and secrete it into the bloodstream. The secretion 
of insulin occurs when the insulin-containing vesicles already present in the cells 
fuse with the cell membrane and release the hormone. In the presence of a high 
concentration of glucose, ATP production in beta-cells is increased and is measured 
by sensitive constraints such as  K+-channels that invert the polarity of the cell mem-
brane and trigger a cascade of changes of activation states of several constraints in 
the cells, involving changes in potentials, that lead to the fusion of insulin contain-
ing vesicles with the membrane and the massive release of the hormone. This con-
trol mechanism, however, is not only sensitive to glucose concentrations (indirectly 
through ATP levels); it is responsive to outputs from other control mechanisms in 
the system which are sensitive to many other, non-metabolic factors. As a result, the 
nervous system, the intestines, and adipose and muscle tissues also participate in the 
modulation of insulin (Roder et al. 2016). Addressing glycaemia regulatory function 
in terms of control mechanisms enables investigators to understand the integration 
of all these contributions to the maintenance of the system.
Decomposition of systems into their components is the hallmark of mechanis-
tic approaches. Adopting it within the autonomy tradition can ground explanations 
of autonomy. Moreover, it can do so without sacrificing the distinctive feature of 
the autonomy tradition—a focus on contributions to the maintenance of the organ-
ism. Functions and the components to which functions are ascribed are identified 
top-down, starting with their contribution to the maintenance of the system rather 
than from their structural features (Bich 2012). Once a function is identified as the 
phenomenon to be explained mechanistically, the constraints involved in its realiza-
tion and the processes they take part in need to be characterized. First, production 
constraints and processes need to be identified. Second, an account of how they are 
produced and maintained within the system needs to be provided. Third, the pos-
sible control constraints acting upon them need to be identified. This implies also 
providing an account of how the controllers detect conditions in the organism or 
its environment that require adaptation and operate appropriately on constraints that 
determine activities in the organism.
Conclusion: a call for constructive engagement between mechanism 
and autonomy
The new mechanists and the autonomy tradition advance alternative perspec-
tives for explaining the capacities of living organisms. Each approach on its own 
has produced important insights. We have argued that each can also benefit from 
22 See Bich et al. (2020) for more details of the explanation of glycaemia regulation from the point of 
view of autonomy.
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engagement with the other. Mechanists can draw upon insights of the autonomy 
tradition in addressing questions about how to characterize phenomena, identity 
components of mechanisms, and generalize mechanistic accounts. Theorists in the 
autonomy tradition can ground their accounts of how autonomy is achieved in an 
understanding of the mechanisms employed. In the last two sections we have pre-
sented examples of ways in which the concepts of constraint, function, and control 
provide foundations for successfully bridging the two philosophical traditions. We 
view these examples as just a start of what could be a prolonged and productive 
engagement between mechanism and autonomy.
We conclude by emphasizing control as a promising locus of engagement. Rec-
ognizing the richness of control processes in biology makes clear that mechanisms 
do not just explain phenomena but explain how they are regulated to serve the needs 
of organisms and contribute to their autonomy. We have singled out a specific kind 
of mechanism—a control mechanism that operates on constraints in other mecha-
nisms on the basis of measuring states of the system or the environment. Many of 
the mechanisms examined by the new mechanists are in fact control mechanisms 
(brain mechanisms are a paradigmatic example). However, their role in controlling 
other mechanisms has not assumed any special significance within the new mech-
anistic framework. They are treated like other mechanisms—causal systems that 
generate phenomena such as producing action potentials, spatial navigation (Craver 
2007), or visual perception (Bechtel 2008). These activities are not ends in their own 
right, but serve to regulate what we earlier characterized as production mechanisms. 
Recognizing that role allows us to understand why they, together with processes 
such as cell signaling (Marks et al. 2017), are characterized as processing informa-
tion—through making measurements they acquire information about the organism 
or its environment and use this information to operate on other mechanisms. The 
importance of this distinction can be captured from the autonomy perspective. Pro-
duction mechanisms do not just exist to generate the phenomenon for which they are 
responsible. Rather, they operate to maintain the autonomy of the organism. This 
requires that they generate the phenomenon when and in the manner that is needed 
by the organism. For this, control is paramount. Control mechanisms perform the 
measurements (or draw upon the measurements) of variables that determine whether 
the activity of the mechanism is needed.
Recognizing the role of control mechanisms provides a new perspective on 
another feature of accounts of mechanism. Production mechanisms are often pre-
sented as operating in a regular manner—any time the start-up conditions are real-
ized, they produce the phenomenon for which they are responsible (Machamer et al. 
2000). Such regularity, however, is often only achieved in experimental arrange-
ments in which mechanisms are studied—it is the specific arrangement of condi-
tions in the experiment that render the operation of a mechanism regular. This ena-
bles researchers to develop accounts of how they operate. But in living organisms, 
regular behavior might be the exception. As adaptive systems, the phenomenon 
required—and hence the work required from a biological mechanism—depends on 
the state of the system and its environment. Producing the phenomenon is a means 
to achieve self-maintenance. Accordingly, an organism can vary its behavior, and 
therefore the operation of the mechanisms responsible for it, when the specific 
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internal and external conditions require an adaptive response. Inability to adapt—for 
example, a heart that cannot change the frequency of contractions in relation to the 
needs for oxygen in the muscles of the organism—is pathological.
Control mechanisms are ubiquitous in biology—both in single- and multi-cellular 
organisms, they vastly outnumber production mechanisms. Moreover, many of the 
changes over the course of evolution have involved the incorporation of new control 
mechanisms that enable organisms to better deploy production mechanisms that per-
form the work needed to maintain, repair, and reproduce themselves (Bechtel and Bich 
2021). In addition, control is central to understanding how different biological functions 
are coordinated to make an organism viable. Insofar as new mechanists have focused 
on inquiries directed within individual mechanisms, which are often studied in condi-
tions in which their activity is regularized, they have failed to recognize the importance 
of these distinctive features of control. Such a focus on individual mechanisms has 
also characterized much of traditional biology. Only recently have topics such as cell 
signaling become prominent topics of research. Control is a challenge to the autonomy 
framework as well, for understanding it requires examining the details through which 
control is realized—decomposing and analyzing the operation of control mechanisms, 
especially how they procure and use information. Understanding biological control will 
benefit from the collaboration of the two approaches. If philosophers of science inter-
ested in mechanistic explanation want to understand how mechanisms are controlled 
to serve organisms, they can lean on the autonomy tradition. At the same time, the 
autonomy framework can benefit from a mechanistic approach to account for how these 
functions are realized and how they are integrated into the organization of the system.
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